Abstract: This paper empirically explores relationships of the government subsidy, R&D investment and innovation performance in new energy vehicle industries. Surrounding a series of problems took place at present, such as cheating of subsidy, and influence of subsidy between R&D and innovation performance. This paper takes the listed companies of new energy automobile stocks as the research object, and analyzes the impact of government subsidies and R&D investment on enterprise innovation performance. The results show that the phenomenon of cheating is obvious in private enterprises, the impact of government subsidy on innovation performance is inverted "U", and different subsidies have different impacts on innovation performance.
Introduction
According to the reports, most of states give a lot of preferential tax policies for the new energy vehicle company to encourage the innovation and development. China is no exception. The central government has taken a lot of subsidy measures to support the development of new energy vehicles. Sales of new energy vehicles had made significant breakthroughs from 2012 to 2016, and its sales reached 507 thousand vehicles, leading the global sales champion. Although the popularization and application of new energy vehicles have made great progress, the market shares of new energy vehicles are very small. And the medias reported some of the new energy automobile enterprise scandals (for government subsidies) phenomenon in 2016. Therefore, people have questioned the status of the development of new energy vehicles about the low market shares and a substantial role of government subsidy. In view of the above series of problems, this paper takes the new energy vehicles listed companies as the research object, and carries on the related research, answers the people's doubts.
Theoretical Review and Research Hypothesis
Literature Review. The government subsidy is a important intervention toy in the markets. The ultimate purpose of development is to bring more reward to the society, and promote social healthy development. So government subsidies also are treated as the judgment signal of investment quality by the investors [1] . The main form of subsidy is special fund [2] . On the subsidies distribution zone, it is common for the government to grant developed provinces area, where there is more high quality manufacturing enterprise [3] . In summary, the government subsidies granted more in the advantages of the disadvantaged industries [4] . Company can use the subsidies to reduce the risks of R&D activities [5] . But different forms of government subsidies on enterprise innovation have different stimulatory effects. Direct government subsidies of innovative enterprises stimulation effect which is more obvious than a tax policy subsidies [6] . At the same time, the contribution of government subsidy to R&D investment is also influenced by enterprise scales, management levels and education level [7] . So government subsidies may have a negative relationship with enterprise R&D investment. The existing research results show that government subsidies have a positive effect on the finance performance [8, 9] . The government grants have a more significant positive effect on firm finance performance under controlling the effect of asset size, liquidity ratio, incentive effect and industry especially in the high-end equipment manufacturing industry, Bioindustry and new energy industry, which presented a "U" relationship between government subsidy and corporate finance performance [10, 11] . And the scholars found that the government subsidies which grant the state-owned don't have a significant effect on corporate financial performance than non-state-owned [12] . On the other hand, the impact of government subsidies on innovation performance is also affected by the time effect, and the lag period generally is two years [13] .
Research Hypothesis. Based on previous studies, we can indicate that the enterprise R&D activities are public, spillover and risky. The R&D investment occupies a part of the funds, which is the non-predictability of R&D activities. So if the R&D activities risk is beyond enterprise expected returns, the companies will not automatically participate in R&D activities. On the one hand, the government subsidy can relieve the pressures on corporate finance. On the other hand, because of the forced by the market pressure of competition, it will stimulate enterprises join in R&D investment [14] . Affected by the nature of ownership, the enterprises scale, credit status and research ability of non-state-owned overall are outperformed the state-owned enterprises [15] . So non-state-owned will be easier to increase R&D investment because of the influence of government subsidies. The following assumptions are made:
H 1 : Government subsidies have a positive impact on R&D investment of enterprises, and nonstate-owned enterprises show more significant.
The R&D activities are uncertain, so it may not be easily to produce economic results for financial performance. we shall use innovative performance instead of financial performance to analyze the development of new energy vehicles industry, and get the hypothesis: H 2 : R&D investment of enterprises has a significant impact on the innovation performance, and the innovation performance of state-owned enterprises is more significant.
In the early stage of research and development activities, the government subsidies can alleviate the financing constraints of corporate R&D activities and other aspects of the pressure. So it has a significant effect to encourage enterprises to increase R&D investment. And the ability of government subsidies is limited. If the rate of return of the basic research project is not up to the expected business, companies are likely to use the government investment subsidies to objective investment projects. Then the government subsidies would have a crowding out effect. Therefore, the following assumptions are drawn:
There is an inverted "U" relationship between government subsidy intensity and enterprise innovation performance mechanism. Non-state-owned enterprises need more government subsidies greater strength to achieve greater innovation performance than the state-owned enterprises. And in the same nature of ownership of enterprises, research and development ability of strong enterprise are more on the efficiency of the use of government subsidies. That year, the total amount of government subsidies accounted for operating income. Size
The logarithm of the total assets of an enterprise. lev Proportion of total liabilities of enterprises to total assets. CF Net cash flow from operating activities as a percentage of operating income. Own State owned enterprises are 1 and non-state-owned enterprises are 0.
Model Setting. In order to confirm stimulating effect for the government subsidies to corporate R&D investment, we use cross item of government subsidies and ownership as an indicator to further explore the influence of government subsidies to R&D investment in the different of nature of property. The modes of H11-H12 verification are established as follow.
We select the innovation performance as explanatory variables, and modify the models. We use cross item of R&D investment and ownership of property as an indicator to further explore the influence of R&D investment to innovation performance in the different of nature of property. The modes of H21-H22 verification are established as follow.
(4) Based on the H 2 hypothesis analysis, the modes of H31-H34 are established as follow in order to verify the inverted "U" relationship between the government subsidy and the enterprise innovation performance. Then we use cross item of government subsidies square and ownership as an indicator to further explore the influence of government subsidies to R&D investment in the different of nature of property under the government subsidy. Then find out interval in different nature of ownership innovation ability of enterprises to achieve optimal performance required by the government the value of the subsidy.
Empirical Results
Summary of Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis. From the table 2, we can know that the average corporate R&D investment strength higher than the government subsidy of about three percentage points. The maximum value of the enterprise R&D investment strength than the strength of government subsidies by only 1.2 percentage points, which also shows the relationship between government subsidies and corporate R&D strength behavior is dynamic, depending on the amount of government subsidies to enterprises to determine their own R&D investment the strength. In the table, all the correlation coefficient is less than 68%, that is to say there is no co linearity between variables. There is a positive correlation between government subsidies and R&D investment (38%). It suggests that the government should subsidized that is enthusiasm to engage in R&D activities. It will have high R&D investment and low proportion of government subsidy (38% lower than 50%). The correlation between R&D investment and innovative patent is positive but weak (0.032), then the firm's size, cash flow' leverage and own dummy all have positive correlation with the dependent variable (innovation). To highlight the factors influencing the enterprise innovation performance; we first analyze the impact of subsidies on R&D activities. Then assess the degree of these subsidies on innovation through R&D investment activities. The results of the estimation of equation 1 summarized in table 4, indicate in model 1 that the subsidies allocated to R&D under control of other variables have a positive influence and significant at the level of 1%. This means that the State, in order to boost economic growth, must participate in the financing of R&D activities. .001 As shown in the results of model 2, subsidies to non-state-owned enterprises are recommended since the regression coefficient of sub × own is negative and significant at the level of 1%. From, the above-estimation we can conclude that, the government subsidies and corporate R&D investment are significantly related, so the results confirmed the policy of government subsidies to help stimulate enterprises to increase R&D investment. It's verified in different ownership enterprises R&D investment activities in the model 2, who are more affected by government subsidies, government subsidies and cross ownership is significantly negative, and R&D activities influence the non-state-owned enterprises is more vulnerable to government subsidies, but also shows the risk of non-state-owned enterprises bear ability limited, will not take the initiative to R&D investment. 
p<0.01
The relationship between R&D investment and enterprise innovation performance is verified in the EQ2_Model1, and the results shows that R&D investment has significant impact on innovation performance. EQ2_Model2 is verified in different ownership enterprises R&D investment innovation performance strength how, who's R&D investment efficiency is higher, the cross term results show that R&D investment and ownership is significantly positive (641.21), indicating that state-owned enterprises R&D investment ability have high efficiency. EQ3_Model1, 2 and 3 help us to verify the relationship between the government subsidies and enterprise innovation performance, the coefficient of government subsidy is significantly positive (671.3969). However, the government subsidies squared has negative relationship with innovation at the level of 1%, namely the government subsidies to the enterprise innovation performance of the first increased and then decreased, which is an inverted "U" type. Government subsidies to some extent reduce the risk of R&D activities, but due to enterprises own conditions, greater development strength won't get effective output. Therefore, who can be more efficient using government subsidies for R&D investment in order to achieve the biggest innovation performance is very important. The ownership enterprises subsidies influence is estimated in the EQ3_Model4, the results show that the square and cross ownership of government subsidies significantly (5011.241) as evidence, namely state-owned enterprises use more efficiently government subsidies to achieve maximum output. The results confirm that the curvilinear relationship between the government subsidies and innovative performance, and corroborates the conditional effect of R&D investment on the relationship between government subsidies and innovative performance. These results confirm and strengthen the explanatory power of the model. The value of the optimal government subsidy interval for enterprises with different R&D levels under different ownership characteristics is shown in Fig 1  and 2 . We can see the interval value of the relationship between GOV R&D Subsidy & Innovation in state-owned about 0 to 5%, while in non-state-owned about 0 to 6%. The results confirm that the non-state-owned companies are more easily stimulated by government subsidy, if government gives more subsidies between 0 and 6%, the innovative performance is more significant. But we can find that although the government improves the subsidy degrees, not most of companies can achieve the performance. It may be cause by fear risks of R&D because of limited abilities. Processing Endogenity. The above mentioned empirical tests assume that the main variables are exogenous those are not correlated with the error term. However, this may not be the case since the GOV R&D variable and the interaction term may not be strictly exogenous. Thus, we must find some valid instruments that are uncorrelated with the errors, but correlated with the endogenous variables and dependent variables. With weak instrument variables the results are likely to be biased in the same way of OLS estimation. To cope with this problem, we use Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator. The AB estimator combines instrument variables (the dependent variable lagged on period) and it is suitable for panel data with few time periods and great number of observations of individuals [16] . Overall, the results confirm the suggested hypotheses. From the table 6, one side, we can confirm that there is no endogenous, and the other side, we can find that all the effects are more significant, when we verify hypotheses combined the data of lag a term. So, it is consistent with previous research that the technological innovation output lags behind. 
